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Payment programs are highly controversial, particularly 
when contracts are made with communities, not 
individuals.
 Effective tool for conservation and poverty alleviation? 
 Equitable and just for all community members? 
 Sustainable: what happens to conservation and livelihoods 
when payments stop?
Payment for conservation  or ecosystem services (PES) 
has emerged as a prominent policy tool to motivate 
conservation and support poverty alleviation in low-
income countries.
In Ecuador, the government started a PES program in 2009 
to support conservation and alleviate poverty on communal 
lands.
Context: Payments in Ecuador
Problem: Paying for Conservation
Results
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Our Research Questions
1. How do communal payments for environmental 
conservation impact household land-use behavior and 
livelihoods? 
2. What happens when payments stop?  
 Communities sign a 20-year 
conservation contract: reduce 
grazing, no agriculture, fire or 
hunting on collective lands.
 Communities receive  
collective payment per area 
conserved. Average of 
$20,000 per year.  
• Communities collectively 
decide how to spend payment.
In 2016, the Ecuadorian government abruptly stopped 
payments. 
Methods
Data Gathering: Fieldwork 2012-2018 
Leader interviews n=44 treatment/ 23control (2013 & 2018)
12 in-depth case studies (7 treatments/5 control)
Focus group discussions; Timeline; Mapping; Transect walks
HH interviews, n=911 (2013 & 2018)
Landcover analysis 2000, 2010, 2018
Analysis
Difference-in-difference and logit models
Institutional analysis of governance changes
Visual interpretation of air photos and satellite images 
PES motivates households to change their land-use 
behaviors; these conservation behaviors may be 
sustained even when payment stop.
Strong communal governance conditions are critical for 
attaining desired conservation, livelihood, and equity 
goals.
52% of households perceived net benefits from participation, but 
communal organizational capacity matters for equity and inclusion.
In poorly organized 
communities, 
households fail to 
have information, 
receive benefits, or 
perceive the 
distribution is fair.
After payments stop, preliminary results indicate grazing continues 
to decline more in PES communities when compared to control.
With communities: This summer we worked with SU 
students to share relevant results with the communities 
where we work.
 Communal maps; 
 Workshops
Ecotourism
Climate change
With Ecuadorian practitioners and policymakers via 
presentations and executive summaries of findings.
With academics
Use your phone to see 
our publications
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In the first stage of the 
program, PES contributed to 
an additional 12% decrease in 
grazing when compared to 
non-participating households. 
Result based on Difference-in-
difference model, n=776, 
R2=.220%
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